A case for quiet diplomacy
PAPER: II
MAINS: General Studies- II: Governance, Constitution, Polity, Social Justice and International relations
Context:
Indian and Chinese troops began a partial disengagement from some of the standoff points along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh, which has seen tensions since early May. That was the first official confirmation that there were ongoing multiple stand-offs along the LAC.
There is a major point of difference which will not be easy to resolve:
- The picture that emerged on June 9 indicated we are at the beginning of the process to resolve the situation, and not at the end.
- Both sides have agreed on a broad plan to defuse four of the five points of discord.
- At Pangong Tso, the Chinese have entrenched their positions with tents and remain on India’s side of the LAC.
Strategy in dealing with China:
- The pattern of resolution of past stand-offs underlines the key role played by quiet diplomacy in unlocking complicated stand-off situations.
- Both the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) and National Democratic Alliance (NDA) governments have followed an approach that has coupled quiet diplomacy with a strong military posture, while at the same time allowing the adversary a way out.
- This has been the broad strategy in dealing with challenges from China across the LAC. And this strategy has generally worked.
- If the government had publicly announced in 2014 it was following a moratorium on patrolling up to India’s LAC to ease tensions, there would have likely been an uproar, just as there was in 2013 after Depsang.
- China, faced with firm resistance, was prevented from changing the status quo.
India’s scepticism about China
- It dates back to the late 1950s and especially the 1962 war.
- Despite a return to full diplomatic ties in the late 1970s, normalisation began with Rajiv Gandhi’s 1988 visit to China and the agreements of 1993.
- Commercial normalisation was only evident after about 2003. But the scepticism never truly disappeared.
The India-China relationship can be considered to have four main components
- One, boundary dispute.
- Two, regional security competition in India’s neighbourhood.
- The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) today leverages China’s resources,
- Nepal settling its border with China in the 1960s,
- China’s sharing of nuclear technology with Pakistan in the 1970s,
- Bangladesh importing Chinese military hardware in the 1980s, and
- Chinese backing for the military junta in Myanmar in the 1990s.
- Three, economic relations. It grew after 2003 but Indian enthusiasm waned as Chinese market access proved limited and the trade deficit widened.
- The fourth aspect was global governance cooperation.
- China and India found common cause at BRICS,
- Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.
- Beijing’s emphasis on international coalition-building was eventually surpassed by its own superpower ambitions.
- India consequently began balancing even as it normalised ties with Beijing.
- China was a major driver of the India-US civil nuclear agreement, which enabled defence and technological relationships with the US and its allies (including Europe, Japan and Australia).
- China’s overt opposition to India’s waiver at the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 2008 indicated its unease with that development.
What approaches did India subsequently adopt?
- First, efforts at internal balancing required a robust Indian economy, appropriate budgetary allocations for national security, and political will to deploy these tools.
- However, the Indian economy did not perform as dynamically as many had hoped after 2011.
- Nonetheless, India activated once-dormant airfields, raised army mountain divisions, reallocated air force assets eastwards, and began to improve border infrastructure.
- Second, Indian aid and concessional loans to the neighbours (especially Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal and the Maldives) increased and naval deployments in the Indian and western Pacific Oceans picked up by late 2017, although capital budgetary allocations did not keep pace.
- India’s willingness to intervene to support Bhutan against Chinese road-building in Doklam was an important statement of intent.
- While these developments have been positive, it is debatable whether they have been sufficient given the widening resource gap with China.
- The latest period of engagement, which began in 2017, revealed that neither China nor India were able or willing to make major compromises.
- India continued to reject both the BRI and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).
- The boundary question remained unanswered. Even on economic relations, China made only minor concessions on agricultural and pharmaceutical imports.
- Even in the absence of real changes, the rhetoric of engagement made sense in the aftermath of the Doklam crisis only because it bought both countries time.
- Finally, external balancing involved a series of arrangements with partners that shared India’s concerns about China, with the intention of improving interoperability, facilitating intelligence and assessments, and boosting each other’s economic and defence capabilities.
- In the past few years, India has made progress in facilitating logistics support, increasing maritime awareness, upgrading military exercises, and regularising strategic dialogues with the US, Japan, Australia, Russia, France, South Korea, Southeast Asia, and others.
- June 2020’s India-Australia “virtual summit” is the latest step in a larger progression.
Coming to terms with reality
- The tensions on the LAC are neither the first nor likely to be the last.
- First, it needs to keep the Opposition informed, which it is clear it hasn’t.
- Second, it needs to proactively engage with the media, even if that may be through low-key engagement as was the case on June 9, that does not escalate into a public war of words. The media cannot be muzzled. India, after all, is not China. So, it is in the government’s own interests to ensure what’s reported is well-informed, and not speculative or exaggerated.
- At the same time, expectations of having a public debate about the intricacies of every border stand-off — or for the Prime Minister to weigh in even while negotiations are ongoing — need to be tempered. This will only risk inflaming tensions, and reduce the wiggle room for both sides to find an off-ramp.
Conclusion:
- The broader objective shouldn’t get lost in political debates.
- That objective is to ensure India’s security interests remain protected — and that the status quo on India’s borders isn’t changed by force.
- Past incidents have shown that quiet diplomacy, coupled with strong military resolve that deters any Chinese misadventures, has been more effective than public saber-rattling, even if we may be inhabiting a media environment that misconstrues loudness as strength, and silence as weakness.