Daily Editorial Analysis for 17th June 2021

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  5. Daily Editorial Analysis for 17th June 2021

Is Blue Dot Network an alternative to China’s BRI?

Why in News

  • Even as the geopolitical situation in the Indo-Pacific has seen the vagaries of the Sino-US rivalry in the recent past, the launch of the Executive Consultation Group for reviving the Blue Dot Network (BDN) took place in Paris on 7 June 2021.
  • This group will work under the auspices of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to look at the potential to offer quality infrastructure investments in the Indo-Pacific region.
  • The BDN as it has come to be known, particularly as an alternative to the BRI, is increasingly pitting countries promoting the liberal order against the Chinese authoritarian order.
  • The BDN looks at promoting investment in high-level infrastructure that is based on maintaining international standards, and seeks to enhance the governance towards the furthering of best practices while promoting open markets as the option to link these projects together.
  • This brings the focus more on the geo-economics of the region, as the Indo-Pacific is emerging as the core of the global rivalry between the US and its allies and China.
  • Increasingly as newer players are entering into the Indo-Pacific region with the aim to further the existing normative order, the space for addressing challenges in the region is providing the opportunity to explore newer areas of collaboration.
  • The Blue Dot Network is emerging as one such area.

Blue Dot Network

  • The idea of the BDN took shape under the Trump administration in November 2019 and was unveiled at the 35th ASEAN Summit that was held in Bangkok.
  • In some senses this was similar to the announcement of the Silk Road Economic Belt initiative that Chinese President unveiled in September 2013 as part of his state visit to Indonesia, for the inauguration of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).
  • Both these initiatives were unveiled in Southeast Asian capitals, clearly emphasising the importance of the region in their calculations, as the area remains vital to issues of connectivity in the wider Indo-Pacific.
  • The view of the BRI solely as an economic outreach initiative is becoming myopic. Progressively countries have expressed concerns over the manner in which the BRI is pushing states into a debt trap, even as vulnerabilities are beginning to creep in over the limits of a country’s strategic autonomy that can be impaired as a factor of the debt trap.
  • The question that raises concerns particularly about the BRI are the motives that drive the construction of certain deep-sea ports in the Indo-Pacific region.
  • The cost of building these ports without a clear sense of their feasibility has been a source of concern for those observing Beijing’s rapid expansion of infrastructure capabilities in a region where several smaller states are critically starved for infrastructure and are drawing closer to the Chinese fold through their vulnerability and openness for infrastructure investments from that nation.
  • With regards to the BDN, initially the region did not respond with much enthusiasm—especially as the Trump administration had little time for ASEAN, as was evident from the repeated absence of the US president in key ASEAN meetings, his preoccupation with China and the trade war that was raging.
  • Earlier efforts of the Obama administration to promote the idea of an Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor (IPEC) also have not seen much progress in the region, particularly given the enormous costs involved in linking the overland routes between South and Southeast Asia through a network of road, railway and maritime port linkages.
  • The core agenda of the Blue Dot Network is to assist smaller countries in developing quality infrastructure that would comply with international certification, particularly focusing on the need to promote transparency and openness related to the investments.
  • This critically emphasised, by implication, that the BRI was not transparent and did not adhere to international certification standards. In January 2020, the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China carried out a survey that revealed lack of transparency in procurements as a key factor that limited the participation of European companies.
  • As China’s relations with other key economic partners has deteriorated, the focus of regional countries endorsing the BRI has seen a significant change.
  • Australia, a key economic partner of China, publicly pulled out of the BRI in April 2021 after the two countries saw a rapid decline in bilateral ties since early last year. India, which has rejected the BRI on grounds of violation of its territory, has seen a drastic dip in bilateral ties with China.
  • New Delhi will not be open to any shift in its position on the BRI, given the sovereignty violations and the Beijing-Islamabad nexus promoted through the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).
  • The BDN actually offers India a better opportunity to cooperate with its partners in the Quad to develop its strategies in consonance with countries with which it is closely aligned to promote the vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific. As the US, Australia and Japan push the initiative forward, India would be better served by deepening its relations with its Quad partners.

GS PAPER III                    

Institutional reform is key to post-Covid-19 national recovery

Why in News

  • The second wave of Covid-19 has exposed serious institutional infirmities in India — in access to health care, in the management of elections, and in the balance between the judiciary and the executive, where the latter’s failure has led the former to step in.


  • India has one of the lowest ratios of population to health care infrastructure. It also invests inadequately in scientific research.
  • Investments in genome sequencing, vaccine research, and preventive health care at the rural district level are key to staying ahead of the curve. Moving from a 1.2% to 3% budgetary allocation for health will be insufficient, especially in this fiscal year, as a large proportion of the funds will — hopefully and presumably — be utilised for the vaccination drive.
  • This will leave marginal funds for capital expenditure towards expansion in medicine and vaccine research and operational costs for the enhanced infrastructure.
  • The intensity of the pandemic has also meant that treatment for other serious illnesses is being postponed indefinitely. There is no substitute for greater investment.
  • This inadequate infrastructure is coupled with a high degree of resistance to the idea of seeking treatment due to lack of awareness, financial implications and fear, especially in rural areas.
  • It is, therefore, essential to develop decentralised schemes that create awareness and access at the district, village
  • and ward levelslocal civil society organisations, self-help groups and community initiatives are critical to the sound implementation of health policy on the ground.
  • Centralized remote-control policies seldom work in a country as diverse as India. All case studies of relatively successful Covid-19 management have a common thread of decentralization.
  • In preparing a larger national apparatus, the district level needs special focus. Public health is also an area that requires cooperative federalism — the Centre has a role and responsibility during a pandemic, and states have an obvious role given that health is a state subject. But citizens are losing their patience with blame games between the states and Centre, and, perhaps, the time has come to fix responsibility.
  • One institutional reform is creating a nodal organisation which, only on the subject matter of health, plays a role bridging Centre-state rifts. To be sure, behind the media headlines, state and Union health officials have been in touch.
  • But to prevent the pulls and pressures of politics, this organisation should be manned only by health care professionals and administrators. This does not negate democratic decision-making.
  • Political inputs are crucial, but it does insulate decision-making from political tussles. All its decisions must be transparent, which will increase pressure on both the Centre and states to comply.
  • The design of this institution will take greater deliberation — and will require a careful balancing act so that neither executive privilege nor constitutional principles are undermined.
  • The Election Commission, endowed with “superintendence over conduct of elections” was subject to public criticism for its negligent role in the recent round of state elections which spread the infection.
  • An independent collegium or committee for appointments of commissioners will greatly help restore public confidence in this constitutional authority that is perceived to be amenable to political interference.
  • It is the constitutional duty of Parliament to usher in a new era of legal reforms which creates a framework of dealing with pandemics, as well as the root causes of it, rather than leaving the country to rely on antiquated legislation.


  • It is only through reforms and investment in India’s health infrastructure, internalizing the principle of decentralization, enabling greater Centre-state cooperation on public health disasters with a defined role for a national body of experts, ensuring that constitutional bodies are insulated from executive pressure, and creating a new legal framework that India will be able to respond effectively to one of the greatest crises our nation has ever faced.

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